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ENCOURAGING SAVINGS UNDER THE EARNED INCOME 
TAX CREDIT: A NUDGE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
Vada Waters Lindsey* 
During 2007, 3.6 million or 9.7% of people in the United States age 65 or older 
were below the poverty level. In light of the number of elderly people living below 
the poverty level, it is important that everyone, including low-income workers, 
have the opportunity to save for retirement. Low-income workers face many chal-
lenges to saving for retirement. The barriers to saving include the lack of access to 
retirement plans and lack of investment savvy. For example, only 42% of workers 
employed in service occupations in the private industry have access to employer re-
tirement plans. The percentage drops to 39% for part-time employees.  
 
This Article proposes that the earned income tax credit (EITC) be expanded to en-
courage saving to help reduce the poverty level. The Article argues that the EITC 
should be structured to “nudge” low-income workers to invest in retirement plans 
and individual retirement accounts to lower the likelihood that they will live below 
the poverty level at retirement. The Article then discusses the importance of saving 
and the ways in which the government has encouraged lower income workers to 
accumulate wealth. Because these efforts have not succeeded in increasing the sav-
ings rate of low-income workers, the government must take additional measures to 
encourage them to save. This Article outlines a detailed plan for the adoption of a 
saving component to the EITC and outlines the importance of automatic contribu-
tions in conjunction with the EITC to maximize the success of the saving 
component. The plan also includes a government match in certain circumstances 
but requires forfeiture of the match for early withdrawals.  
I. Introduction 
Generally, retirees rely on the “three-legged stool” of Social Se-
curity, pension plans, and personal savings.1 However, while 
upper-income taxpayers frequently take advantage of the tax in-
centives provided by traditional 401(k) retirement plans and 
Individual Retirements Accounts (IRAs), lower-income taxpayers 
                                                   
!" Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Michigan State 
University; J.D., DePaul University College of Law; LL.M., Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter. I am grateful for comments from my colleagues who participated in a Marquette Works-
in-Progress Workshop. I am also grateful to Erica Hayden, Marquette University Law School 
Class of 2010, for her invaluable research assistance. This Article is dedicated to the memory 
of my dear sister, Veronica Flournoy. 
1. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing the Three-Legged 
Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 938, 939 (2007).  
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generally do not invest in these tax-deferred savings vehicles.2 Em-
pirical data establishes that, of the baby boomers, the wealthiest 
10% own more than two-thirds of the capital investments and pri-
vate retirement assets.3 Significantly, of the balance of the baby 
boomers, 30% of them did not own any private retirement assets.4 
This savings gap will have tremendous ramifications if not ad-
dressed.  
For the first time since the Great Depression, the personal sav-
ings rate for Americans is negative.5 In 2006, one study found that 
44% of retirees are at risk of falling below their current standard of 
living in retirement.6 The same study found that the situation is 
getting more serious over time. About 35% of baby boomers born 
between 1948 and 1954 will have insufficient retirement income.7 
This number increases to 44% for baby boomers born between 
1955 and 1964 and then rises to 48% for Generation Xers born 
between 1965 and 1974.8 In 2007, 3.6 million or 9.7% of people in 
the United States age sixty-five or older were below the poverty lev-
el, up from 9.4% in 2006.9 The number of people age sixty-five and 
over living below the poverty level grew by 200,000 between 2006 
and 2007.10 In 2007, an additional 2.4 million or 6.4% of these in-
dividuals were considered to be “near poor” because their income 
was between the poverty level and 125% of the poverty level.11 The 
poverty rate for women was startlingly high,12 particularly among 
Hispanic and African American women. For 2007, the poverty rate 
                                                   
2. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Sav-
ings Accounts, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 1101, 1127#28 (2006). 
3. John Burritt McArthur, Private Pensions and the Justification for Social Security, 48 S. 
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 28–29 (2006).  
4. Id. at 29.  
5. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About 
Health, Welfare, and Happiness!103 (2008). 
6. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Do Households Have a Good Sense of Their Retirement Prepared-
ness?, Ctr. for Retirement Res. at B.C., 1 (Aug. 2008), http://crr.bc.edu/images/ 
stories/ib_8-11.pdf. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and 
Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007, at 12-13 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf.  
10. Id. at 12. 
11. Admin. on Aging, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., A Profile of Older 
Americans: 2008, at 11 (2008), available at http://www.aoa.gov/AOARoot/Aging_ 
Statistics/Profile/2008/docs/2008profile.pdf.  
12. For a discussion of outlining proposals to the Social Security program to counter 
the poverty rate of elderly women, see Julia J. DiPasquale, Social Security Reform: Keeping Elder-
ly Women Out of Poverty, 4 Nat’l Acad. Elder L. Att’ys J. 183 (2008).  
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for Hispanic and African American women who resided alone was 
39.5% and 39%, respectively.13  
The number of elderly people living below the poverty level 
demonstrates the crucial nature of retirement savings. The earned 
income tax credit (EITC) can be a fundamental tool for encourag-
ing saving to help reduce poverty among the elderly population. 
The EITC is the largest tax benefit program for working individu-
als.14 It provides substantial tax dollars to the working poor and 
other low-income workers. For example, for taxable year 2009, the 
maximum EITC was $5,657.15 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
granted EITC benefits of approximately $48 billion to around 24 
million taxpayers during taxable year 2007.16 
The current unemployment rate is 9.7%.17 In light of current 
economic conditions,18 the IRS anticipates that, based on reduced 
wages, more taxpayers will be eligible to receive the EITC.19 It is 
therefore important to consider whether the EITC is an effective 
tax incentive or whether statutory modification is necessary to fur-
ther enhance the credit to better achieve the policy goals of the 
EITC.  
One significant flaw of the EITC that suggests modification is 
warranted is that recipients currently are not encouraged to save or 
invest the increase in the after-tax income resulting from the re-
ceipt of the EITC. In fact, the EITC discourages such use by 
denying taxpayers with excessive investment income access to the 
credit.20 Anecdotal evidence suggests that a lump sum payment may 
encourage the recipients to buy an unnecessary “big ticket” item 
rather than purchasing more practical consumable items such as 
food or paying for energy costs, as noted in the EITC’s legislative 
                                                   
13. Admin. on Aging, supra note 11, at 11.  
14. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 34 (2006); Timothy M. Smeeding, The Earned Income Tax Credit: 
The EITC and USAs/IDAs: Maybe a Marriage Made in Heaven?, 8 Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 7, 8 
(2002). 
15. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862. 
16. I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-8 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
17. Jobs Still Elusive, 5 States Posted Record Unemployment Rate in January, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
11, 2010, at B9. For detailed unemployment statistics, see Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
U.S. Department of Labor, News Release USDL-10-0886, The Employment Situa-
tion—June 2010, at tbl.A-1 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ 
empsit_07022010.pdf. 
18. A significant motivation behind the EITC’s enactment in 1975 was an economy in a 
period of economic decline, with an unemployment rate of 8.2%, its highest level since 
1941. S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 1 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 54. A secondary con-
sideration behind its enactment was the expected stimulation of the economy. Id. at 7-8.  
19. I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-8 (Jan. 30, 2009). 
20. See I.R.C. § 32(i) (West Supp. 2010). 
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history.21 In fact, this history indicates that Congress recognized the 
potential for the EITC to enable the working poor to purchase 
consumable products. Thus the purchase of a nonessential luxury 
item does not completely comport with the statutory intent to pro-
vide financial relief to EITC recipients.  
An important question thus is whether the EITC should be mod-
ified to further encourage low-income workers to save for 
retirement. Professor Dorothy Brown recently wrote an article ar-
guing that recipients of the EITC have been unfairly targeted and 
that tax scholars offered no hope to them.22 She challenged “politi-
cians, journalists, and academics to acknowledge that we owe more 
to low-income taxpayers.”23 I agree that the tax scheme needs to be 
modified for the benefit of low-income workers. Specifically, the 
EITC should be structured to “nudge” low-income workers to in-
vest in retirement plans and IRAs to lower the likelihood that they 
will live below the poverty level during retirement.24  
The federal government recognized the significance of encour-
aging low-income individuals to engage in long-term savings when 
it enacted the saver’s credit and established the “Assets for Inde-
pendence” program administered by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and 
Families’ Office of Community Services.25 Under the Assets for In-
dependence program, participants save earned income in matched 
“Individual Development Accounts.”26 Unfortunately, in recent 
years, only 10,000 people nationwide have enrolled in the pro-
gram.27 In addition, the number of taxpayers claiming the saver’s 
credit has generally declined since its enactment.28 The federal 
EITC program should incorporate the positive aspects of the Assets 
for Independence program and the saver’s credit to create more 
widespread savings for the working poor and other low-income 
workers while eschewing their flaws.  
                                                   
21. But cf. infra text accompanying note 104.  
22. Dorothy Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 790, 801 
(2007). 
23. Id. at 802.  
24. Thaler and Sunstein suggest that most workers who do not enroll in their employ-
er’s retirement plan are simply procrastinating and may require a nudge, defined as “any 
factor that significantly alters the behavior of Humans” to get them to save for retirement. 
Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 8.  
25. See About Assets for Independence, Admin. for Children & Families, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/afi/assets.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) [herein-
after About Assets]. 
26. See id.  
27. Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based 
Welfare System, 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 721, 816 (2005). 
28. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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Part II will discuss the importance of saving and the ways in which 
the government has encouraged low-income workers to accumulate 
wealth. The approaches adopted by the government involve both 
direct expenditures and tax incentives to promote the working poor 
and other low-income individuals to increase savings. Part III will 
outline federal programs created to promote savings. Part IV will 
explore the challenges to increased savings by low-income workers. 
The barriers to saving include lack of access to retirement plans and 
lack of investment savvy. Part V of this Article will discuss the EITC. It 
will consider the purpose of the credit and outline eligibility re-
quirements. It will also extensively analyze the problems with the 
current EITC. Part VI will propose the adoption of a saving compo-
nent to the EITC. Other scholars have suggested that the EITC be 
linked to an asset-building policy.29 This Article proposes a detailed 
plan for such a policy’s implementation. The proposal outlines the 
importance of automatic contributions in conjunction with the 
EITC to nudge low-income workers to save for retirement and to 
maximize the success of the saving component.  
II. The Importance of Saving 
During his tenure as a U.S. Senator, Rick Santorum stated that 
the significant causes of poverty were the lack of “access to capital 
and barriers to wealth creation.”30 According to Santorum, one of 
the greatest social problems during the last century was poverty 
among the elderly.31 He believed that welfare reform was an im-
portant first step towards establishing economic stability for former 
recipients, that the cause of the widening gap between the rich and 
poor is the asset gap rather than the income gap, and that low-
income individuals must have a chance to accrue savings.32 The  
Office of Community Services, an agency of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services has explained that asset building rather 
than income generation is instrumental to ending the cycle of pov-
erty.33 According to the agency, 25% of households would not be 
able to sustain themselves for more than three months if they lost 
their income source, and 47% of American children live in  
                                                   
29. See, e.g., Daniel P. Gitterman et al., Expanding EITC for Single Workers and Couples 
Without Children: Tax Relief for All Low-Wage Workers, 15 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y, 245, 
249#50 (2008); Smeeding, supra note 14.  
30. Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New Millennium: Transforming Poverty in Ameri-
ca, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 383, 383 (2002). 
31. See id.  
32. Id. at 383–85.  
33. About Assets, supra note 25.  
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households without significant financial assets.34 Finally, research 
conducted by the agency has established that the divorce rate is 
lower for families with assets, that families with assets are healthier, 
and that future generations of families with assets are less likely to 
live in poverty.35  
There are numerous reasons why individuals must also have suf-
ficient savings for retirement. Several factors impact the amount of 
savings that are necessary to sustain a retiree for the duration of 
retirement, including the expected post-retirement living expens-
es, anticipated future investment returns, and life expectancy and 
other relevant mortality statistics.36 As individuals age, an unex-
pected and catastrophic medical condition may deplete their life 
savings. Individuals must also plan for long-term care needs in re-
tirement, which are frequently ignored in retirement planning.37 
The current unemployment rate of 9.7% will undoubtedly impact 
retirement savings and may require the unemployed to exhaust 
long-term savings in order to pay for basic necessities and living 
expenses.  
Many state and municipal public pension plans are underfund-
ed.38 The increase in life expectancies means that retirees will need 
a higher level of savings to sustain themselves during their retire-
ment. One of the biggest reasons people need to have retirement 
savings is that the “pay as you go” Social Security program is in 
jeopardy of having a negative balance beginning in 2017, at which 
point benefits to retirees will exceed Social Security revenue.39 
Moreover, the average Social Security benefits of $13,836 for re-
tired workers40 is only slightly greater than the $13,014 poverty 
                                                   
34. Id.  
35. Id.  
36. Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 407, 409 (2007).  
37. See generally id. (providing an in-depth discussion of types of long-term care and the 
different ways to fund such care). 
38. See, e.g., Terry Savage, Battle Brewing over Pensions; Stock Market Crash Leaves State’s 
Plans Critical Just as Baby Boomers Set to Retire, Chi. Sun-Times, Jan. 25, 2009, at A20 (stating 
that the Illinois state-funded pension system is more underfunded than any other state and 
that the plans were approximately 50% of the required funding level); Jeff Shields, City Not 
Behind Pa. Idea on Pensions, Phila. Inquirer, July 4, 2009, at B01 (stating that the Philadel-
phia municipal pension plan is currently funded at 53% but projected to go below 50% by 
June 2010 and remain so for many years).  
39. See Befort, supra note 1, at 943. Professor Befort explains that the negative balance 
in the Social Security program will arise because of the increasing life spans and retirement 
of impending baby boomers and the decline in the number of future wage earners resulting 
from the decline in birth and immigration rates. Id. at 943#44.  
40. Soc. Sec. Admin., SSA Pub. No. 13-11785, Fast Facts & Figures About Social 
Security, 2009, at 15 (2009), available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/ 
fast_facts/2009/fast_facts09.pdf.  
Lindsey ITP 2M.doc  11/19/2010 1:40 PM 
Fall 2010] Encouraging Savings Under the EITC 89 
threshold for a householder 65 years and older for 2008.41 The So-
cial Security program has succeeded in reducing the level of 
poverty among the elderly.42 However, according to Santorum, de-
mographic changes in family sizes, life-spans, and the retirement of 
baby boomers will continue to thwart the effectiveness of the “pay-
as-you-go” scheme.43 By 2050, 20% of Americans will be over age 
sixty-five.44 The demographic changes will result in an unfunded 
liability in the program of at least $3.2 trillion by 2030.45 As a result, 
Social Security benefits should not be relied on as a retiree’s only 
revenue stream during retirement.  
III. Federal Programs to Promote Savings 
The federal government has implemented both direct expendi-
tures and tax incentive programs to promote increased savings by 
the working poor and other low-income individuals. It is important 
to understand how the EITC fits within the context of other feder-
al programs. Any modification to the EITC to encourage savings 
will supplement these existing programs. The Internal Revenue 
Code contains numerous tax incentives encouraging retirement 
saving and other forms of investments.46 An employee is entitled to 
defer income for contributions made by the employer and em-
ployee to a qualified47 defined contribution or defined benefit48 
                                                   
41. Poverty Thresholds for 2008 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18 
Years, U.S. Census Bureau (2008), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshold/ 
thresh08.html (last visited May 12, 2010).  
42. See Santorum, supra note 30, at 387#88.  
43. Id. at 388. According to Santorum, “[i]n 1960, there were over five workers for eve-
ry beneficiary. Today there are three and a half workers per beneficiary, and by 2030 there 
will be just over two.” Id.  
44. Id.  
45. Id. 
46. Unfortunately, the tax subsidies have primarily benefited upper income taxpayers. 
See Creola Johnson, Welfare Reform and Asset Accumulation: First We Need a Bed and a Car, 2000 
Wis. L. Rev. 1221, 1228 (stating that the rich and middle class are able to take advantage of 
the tax benefits of retirement savings but the low income individuals do not have the same 
opportunities); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Eco-
nomic Theory, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275, 1275#76 (1991) (“The highest subsidies are paid to 
affluent consumers who need pensions the least, while those most in need often have no 
pension coverage at all.”).  
47. The requirements for qualification are set forth in I.R.C. § 401(a).  
48. Defined benefit plans provide employees with lifelong retirement benefits based 
on how long they have been with the employer and how much money they have made. They 
place the investment risk on the employer while defined contribution plans place the in-
vestment risk on the employee. Befort, supra note 1, at 947. According to the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, most employers are now offering defined contribution plans rather than 
defined benefit plans. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, National 
Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in Private Industry in the United States, 
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retirement plan until the contributions are distributed because 
contributions are deductible.49 A key benefit of the qualified re-
tirement plan is that the employee is not required to forfeit 
employer contributions once the employee meets the vesting re-
quirements. Under the Internal Revenue Code, an employee must 
be fully vested in the employee’s own contributions in order for 
the plan to be considered a qualified defined benefit or defined 
contribution plan.50 In other words, an employee’s contributions to 
a pension plan must be nonforfeitable; hence, the employee is en-
titled to 100% of these contributions. An employee, however, may 
forfeit employer contributions to a retirement plan if the employee 
does not satisfy the requisite years of service. The determination of 
when an employee becomes vested in employer contributions de-
pends on whether the plan is a defined benefit or defined 
contribution one, the employee’s length of service, and the vesting 
schedule.51  
The minimum vesting requirements for a defined benefit plan 
are satisfied where an employee is 100% vested in employer con-
tributions and for any accrued benefit from the employer 
contributions if the employee has completed at least five years of 
service.52 The vesting requirements are also satisfied where an em-
ployee is 20% vested after three years of service with increases of 
an additional 20% each year until the employee has completed 
seven years of service at which time the employee becomes 100% 
vested in the employer contributions.53 Consequently, under the 
latter vesting schedule, if the employee is terminated from a job 
after five years of service, the employee is vested in 60% of the em-
ployer contributions but forfeits the additional 40% of employer 
                                                   
March 2006, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter National Compensation Survey], available at 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebsm0004.pdf. For example, there are about 38,000 active 
defined benefit plans in effect today, compared to a high of about 114,000 in 1985. Choosing 
a Retirement Plan: Defined Benefit Plan, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/retirement/article/ 
0,,id=108950,00.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2010). During 2006, 21% of workers had access 
to defined benefit plans, and 54% of workers had access to defined contribution plans. Na-
tional Compensation Survey, supra, at 6. The 401(k) plans are the most common form of 
defined contribution plans. Under a defined contribution plan, the employee contributes a 
percentage of earnings into the employee’s individual 401(k) account and the employer has 
the option to “match” a portion of the contribution with its own funds. The employee must 
not only determine the contribution percentage but also the investment allocation and 
specifics of withdrawal upon retirement. Befort, supra note 1, at 946.  
49. See I.R.C. § 402(g)(1). The maximum amount that can be contributed to a retire-
ment plan is $16,500 in 2009 unless the employee is aged 50 and over where an additional 
$5500 “catch-up” contribution is allowed in 2009. See id. § 402(g)(1)(C). 
50. Id. § 411(a)(1). 
51. See id. § 411(a)(2). 
52. Id. § 411(a)(2)(A)(ii).  
53. Id. § 411(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
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contributions. With respect to a defined contribution plan, an em-
ployee must be entitled to a nonforfeitable interest in 100% of 
employer contributions after three years of service, or 20% of em-
ployer contributions after two years of service, with an increase of 
20% each year until six years of employment at which time the 
employee is 100% vested.54  
 In addition to employer retirement plans, an individual is also 
entitled to claim a deduction for contributions to a traditional IRA 
subject to an adjusted gross income phase-out.55 Although not tar-
geted at low-income workers, the deferral of income for 
contributions to 401(k) plans and traditional IRAs is the most sig-
nificant tax incentive that promotes retirement saving under the 
Code. In addition, the Roth IRAs provide a valuable tax incentive 
that encourages retirement saving. Congress changed the land-
scape of retirement saving by enacting the Roth IRA under the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.56 In contrast to traditional IRAs, con-
tributions to Roth IRAs are made on an after-tax basis and are not 
deductible.57 While taxpayers are not entitled to a deduction for 
the amount contributed to a Roth IRA, distributions are excluded 
from gross income if they are made after the contributor reaches 
age 59 ½ or becomes disabled, are made to a beneficiary after the 
death of the contributor, or are made to a contributor for the pur-
chase of a first home.58  
Another tax incentive under the Code that is intended to en-
courage retirement savings is the “saver’s credit.” The saver’s credit 
is a nonrefundable credit intended to encourage low-income 
                                                   
54. Id. § 411(a)(2)(B). 
55. See id. § 219(a). The maximum deduction is $5000 for individuals under age fifty 
and $6000 for individuals age fifty and older. Id. § 219(b)(5).  
56. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302, 111 Stat. 788, 825#29. 
57. I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1). The Roth IRA is completely phased out for married taxpayers 
filing a joint return with adjusted gross income of $176,000 or more and for taxpayers using 
the filing status of single or head of household with adjusted gross income of $120,000 or 
more. IRS, Dep’t of Treasury, Pub. 17, Your Federal Income Tax: For Individuals 131 
tbl.17-3 (2009) [hereinafter Your Federal Income Tax], available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf. For taxpayers who use the filing status of married 
filing separately, the maximum adjusted gross income is either $10,000 or $120,000, de-
pending on whether the spouse lived with the taxpayer during the taxable year. Id. A 
taxpayer may convert a regular IRA to a Roth IRA if the taxpayer: (a) transfers the money 
during the tax year; (b) has a modified AGI, for Roth purposes, of less than $100,000; and 
(c) is not married filing separately. I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1). During taxable year 2010, income 
limits on converting a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA have been eliminated. See Staff of 
Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Congress, General Explanation of Tax Legislation 
Enacted in the 109th Congress 311–13 (Comm. Print 2007), available at http:// 
www.jct.gov/s-1-07.pdf.  
58. I.R.C. § 408A(d)(2); see also id. § 72(t)(8) (providing the eligibility rules for the 
first-time homebuyer including lifetime maximum homebuyer distributions of $10,000).  
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workers to make contributions to an IRA or retirement plan. In 
order to compute the credit, the taxpayer must multiply an appli-
cable percentage by the taxpayer’s contribution.59 The maximum 
credit for individual taxpayers is $1000 because the maximum 
credit is 50% of the contribution and the maximum contribution 
taken into account is $2000.60 Where married taxpayers each make 
eligible contributions, each spouse is entitled to the credit, for a 
maximum credit of $2000. Congress enacted the saver’s credit be-
cause it recognized that low-income individuals may have difficulty 
saving; a large portion of their disposable income is used to ac-
quire necessities of life, and the tax credit may provide additional 
resources to save.61  
Originally enacted as a temporary credit in 2001, Congress made 
the credit permanent in 2006.62 IRS statistics establish that between 
2002 and 2006, the number of returns claiming the credit has de-
creased by over 9% and the total amount of the credit claimed by 
all taxpayers has decreased over 8%.63 During taxable year 2007, 
there was a substantial increase in the number of taxpayers claim-
ing the saver’s credit over the number of taxpayers who claimed it 
in 2006 and a substantial increase in the actual credit amount; 
however, the increased 2007 credit amount was still lower than the 
                                                   
59. See id. § 25B. The credit, adjusted for inflation, is claimed on Form 8880 “Credit 
for Qualified Retirement Savings Contributions.” That form contains the applicable per-
centages. For taxable year 2009, the credit is completely phased out for married taxpayers 
filing joint returns with adjusted gross income of at least $55,501, for taxpayers using the 
filing status of head of household with adjusted gross income of at least $41,626, and for 
single taxpayers with adjusted gross income of at least $27,751. See Your Federal Income 
Tax, supra note 57, at 260. 
60. I.R.C. § 25B(b). 
61. Specifically, the legislative history states: 
The Committee recognizes that the rate of private savings in the United States is low; 
in particular many low- and middle-income individuals have inadequate savings or no 
savings at all. A key reason for these low levels of saving is that lower-income families 
are likely to be more budget constrained with competing needs such as food, cloth-
ing, shelter, and medical care taking a larger portion of their income. The 
Committee believes providing an additional tax incentive for low- and middle-income 
individuals will enhance their ability to save adequately for retirement. 
S. Comm. on Finance, Restoring Earnings to Lift Individuals and Empower Families 
(Relief) Act of 2001, S. Rep. No. 107-30 § VI(B)(h) (2001); see also Economic Growth and 
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 618, 115 Stat. 38, 106.  
62. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 812, 120 Stat. 780, 997. 
63. See Selected Historical and Other Data, SOI Bull., Spring 2009, at 121, 128 tbl.1 [here-
inafter Historical Data], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09sprbul.pdf. The 
number of taxpayers that claimed the credit during 2002 was 5,307,176 but only 5,192,133 
claimed it in 2006. Id. The amount of the credit claimed in 2002 was $1,058,219,000; howev-
er, the amount claimed during taxable year 2006 was only $893,957,000. Id.  
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amount claimed in 2002.64 The nonrefundable aspect of the saver’s 
credit may impact the amount of saver’s credits claimed. According 
to Professor Befort, the saver’s credit does not encourage low-
income workers to claim it because more than 80% of return eligi-
ble filers do not have any tax liability.65 To resolve this issue, he 
proposes that the federal government convert the saver’s credit to 
a refundable one.66 Making the credit refundable will enable an 
eligible taxpayer without a tax liability to receive the credit as a re-
fund on the taxpayer’s tax return. 
In addition to the tax incentives for retirement saving, in 1998 
the federal government also established the “Assets for Independ-
ence” program, a direct expenditure program, to promote savings 
and asset accumulation for low-income individuals.67 Under the 
program, low-income individuals are able to invest earned income 
in “Individual Development Accounts” (IDA) sponsored by “com-
munity-based [nonprofit organizations] and State, local, and Tribal 
governmental agencies” and receive a match on the amount in-
vested.68  
As of 2007, state-supported IDA programs have been established 
in 22 states.69 The targeted population under this program includes 
recipients of the EITC.70 The program is designed to encourage 
low-income individuals to save for the acquisition of a first home,71 
capitalization of a small business, training, or enrollment in  
                                                   
64. See id. at 112 fig.A. The number of taxpayers claiming the saver’s credit was ap-
proximately six million, and the total credit amount was $997,343,000 in tax year 2007—
representing increases from tax year 2006 of 13.5% and 9.8%, respectively. Id.  
65. Befort, supra note 1, at 985.  
66. Id. at 986.  
67. Community Opportunities, Accountability, and Training and Educational Services 
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-285, §§ 401-416, 112 Stat. 2702, 2759#72.  
68. About Assets, supra note 25. For a detailed discussion of the IDA program, see gen-
erally Johnson, supra note 46. See also Emily Marroquin, Note, Alleviating Women’s Poverty 
Through Asset Development: Promising Directions, 11 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 157 (2004) 
(exploring how the IDA program can be used as a tool to alleviate the increasing poverty 
rate of women). 
69. State IDA Policy Summary Tables, Ctr. for Soc. Dev., 2-3 tbl.1 (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/individuals/paper-csd.pdf. 
70. See About Assets, supra note 25. 
71. In light of the numerous foreclosures of subprime loans, the Corporation for En-
terprise Development (CFED) conducted a survey of IDA participants to see whether they 
had lost their homes through foreclosure. See IDA Program Survey on Homeownership and Fore-
closure, Corp. for Enter. Dev. (June 2008), http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/ida_program_ 
survey_homeown_foreclose.pdf. The CFED surveyed 1212 of the 8000 individuals who used 
an IDA account to help acquire a home within the last five years, and respondents reported 
that there had been three defaults and four foreclosures. Id. The low foreclosure rate was 
attributable to financial education and homeownership counseling both prior and subse-
quent to the acquisition and review of loan documents by sponsors of the IDA programs. Id.  
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post-secondary education.72 A key service provided under the IDA 
program is financial education.73 This is a valuable service for in-
dividuals who may lack banking and investment experience. 
Significantly, however, saving for other purposes, including re-
tirement saving, is not one of the stated objectives.74 Additional 
programs are needed to encourage retirement saving by low-
income workers because the Assets for Independence program 
does not promote participant retirement saving.  
IV. Challenges to Increased Savings by Low-Income 
Workers—Barriers to Saving 
A. Lack of Investment Savvy  
It is uncontroverted that there is a correlation between a per-
son’s education level and wages.75 Hence, many recipients of the 
EITC may lack the educational background, investment savoir-
faire, or resources to set up a traditional or Roth IRA unaided by 
an investment professional. Because it is unlikely that a low-income 
worker will utilize the services of a financial consultant, special 
measures must be established to nudge low-income workers to save 
for retirement.  
First, in order for the federal government to encourage low-
income retirement saving, the worker must appreciate the signifi-
cance of retirement saving, and the worker must understand the 
different types of retirement savings vehicles. Four federal agencies 
                                                   
72. See About Assets, supra note 25.  
73. Id.  
74. Professor Creola Johnson argues that the program should be expanded to include 
savings for the purchase of automobiles and household durables. See Johnson, supra note 46, 
at 1244#45. Professor Johnson is particularly concerned about creating an opportunity for 
current and former welfare recipients to accumulate assets for the purchase of durable 
goods, and she explains the inability of the use of IDA funds to acquire such goods as the 
reason for low participation among welfare or former welfare recipients. Id. Professor John-
son cited Michael Sherraden, the creative force behind the IDA program, for the 
proposition that there are substantial national economic benefits with the development of 
an asset accumulation program for welfare recipients. Id. at 1229#30. The economic benefits 
include “(1) a permanent reduction in poverty, (2) the development of a more economical-
ly savvy and productive citizenry, (3) an improvement in the nation’s savings rate, and (4) 
the advancement of the nation as a competitor in a global economy.” Id. at 1230.  
75. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median incomes during 2008 for work-
ers twenty-five to sixty-four years old were as follows: $25,689 for workers without a high 
school diploma; $33,806 for workers with a high school diploma; $55,729 for workers with a 
Bachelor’s degree; and $100,000 for workers with a professional degree. See Current Popula-
tion Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/ 
perinc/new03_028.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). 
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are involved in educating individuals to save for retirement: the 
Department of Labor, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
the Department of the Treasury, and the Social Security Admin-
istration.76 The administrative agencies must continue to educate 
the low-income worker about the importance of retirement saving. 
The IRS, an agency within the Department of the Treasury, rou-
tinely issues notices and fact sheets explaining various tax 
incentives.77 It has a user-friendly website that contains all of its 
publications.78 However, it is unlikely that the average layperson 
visits the site to research tax incentives. More direct communica-
tion is required to promote retirement saving amongst the working 
poor and other low-income workers.  
Lessons can be learned from the recent reforms in the credit 
card industry. One of the consequences of those reforms is that 
credit card companies must include a disclosure on a statement 
about the amount of interest and the required length of repay-
ment where the debtor only pays the minimum balance.79 The 
statement must also contain the amount a debtor must pay in or-
der to pay off the debt in three years.80 Congress enacted the Credit 
Card Reform Law out of concern that minimum payment practices 
enhance the problem of unmanageable debt faced by many debt-
ors today and that disclosure will help consumers regain control of 
cascading credit card debt in a manner that is “not too onerous for 
credit card companies.”81 In light of the challenges that low-income 
workers face in accruing sufficient funds for retirement, adminis-
trative agencies charged with educating individuals about 
retirement need to develop a plan that incorporates direct com-
munication to low-income workers in a manner that is easy to 
understand. Low-income workers need the same type of transpar-
ency that has been established in the credit card business to help 
them make informed choices about saving for retirement. 
Second, the IRS must continue to promote the Voluntary In-
come Tax Assistance (VITA) Program and electronic filing. The 
$1.75 billion in EITC benefits paid to commercial tax providers 
                                                   
76. Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social Security Administration, 92 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 323, 348 (2007). 
77. For example, in January 2010 the IRS issued fact sheet 2010-12 to outline taxable 
year 2009 EITC eligibility rules. See EITC Eligibility Rules for 2009 Tax Year Outlined, IRS.gov 
(Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=218830,00.html. 
78. See Publications and Notices, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/app/picklist/list/ 
publicationsNoticesPdf.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). 
79. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(b)(11) (West 2010); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734. 
80. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1637(b)(11)(B)(iii). 
81. 155 Cong. Rec. H5030 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Rep. Miller).  
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undermines the purpose of the EITC and transfers much needed 
dollars from the intended recipients.82 By utilizing the VITA Pro-
gram, an EITC recipient is able to take advantage of the free tax 
preparation services and electronic filing. When a taxpayer files 
electronically, particularly where the refund is to be directly deposit-
ed into an account at a bank or other financial institution, the IRS’s 
payment of the tax refund is significantly accelerated. According to 
the IRS, one of the benefits of electronic filing over paper returns is 
that, where the refund is directly deposited, refunds may be issued 
in half the time and within 10 days of electronic filing.83 An added 
benefit of electronic filing is that the tax returns are more accurate 
as a result of transmission checks.84 Consequently, increasing the 
number of electronic returns may reduce the number of errors on 
the EITC returns.  
B. Means-Tested Benefit Programs 
Low-income individuals may lose entitlement to government 
benefits if their investments and other assets exceed a certain 
amount. As a result, a recipient of these benefits is encouraged to 
spend rather than save. In order to qualify for several direct ex-
penditure programs, an individual must be limited in the amount 
of resources or assets owned, including bank accounts. For exam-
ple, individuals cannot have a net worth exceeding $10,000 
(excluding a home and one automobile) when they enroll in the 
Assets for Independence program.85 In order for a recipient to be 
eligible to receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
benefits (also known as food stamps),86 a household is generally 
not permitted to have assets greater than $2000 ($3000 if a mem-
ber of the household is age sixty or older or disabled) or a vehicle 
with a fair market value over $4650, unless the vehicle is used to 
produce income or the vehicle falls under another allowable ex-
emption.87 Assets held in retirement accounts, including defined 
                                                   
82. See Ronald H. Silverman, Toward Curing Predatory Lending, 122 Banking L.J. 483, 
490 (2005). 
83. E-File, Free File and Other Electronic Options for 2010, IRS.gov (Jan. 2010), http:// 
www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=217790,00.html. 
84. Id.  
85. About Assets, supra note 25.  
86. During 2009, the U.S. Governmental Accountability Office estimated that 33.7 mil-
lion people receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits each month. See 
Support for Low-Income Individuals and Families: A Review of Recent GAO Work, GAO, 5 (Feb. 22, 
2010), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10342r.pdf.  
87. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Eligibility, Food & Nutrition Serv., U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/applicant_recipients/eligibility.htm (last 
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benefit and contribution plans and IRAs, and the value of a home 
are not counted toward the allowable assets.88 In order to deter-
mine eligibility for Medicaid, resources such as bank accounts and 
real estate are considered.89 The eligibility ceiling varies from state 
to state and depends on the eligible group of which the individual 
is a member.90 Finally, all states with the exception of Virginia limit 
the amount of assets a recipient can have in order to receive the 
modern form of welfare benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) cash assistance.91 Most states have asset limits 
ranging from $1000 to $3000 and allow some form of vehicle ex-
emption.92  
C. Low-Percentage of Participation in Employer Qualified 401(k) Plans 
1. Percentage of Workers with Access to Retirement Plans 
One of the most economically beneficial aspects of many re-
tirement plans is the employer match. Between 1995 and 2005, the 
amount of employer contributions to employee pension plans and 
insurance funds has grown by almost 100%.93 However, based on 
statistics from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 65% of all 
workers employed in private industry had access to employer re-
tirement benefits in March 2010.94 In addition, workers in service 
industries, part-time workers, and workers in the lowest 25 percen-
tile had less access to employer retirement plans than other types 
of workers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
                                                   
visited Sept. 21, 2010). The additional vehicular exemptions include a vehicle with little 
equity because it is encumbered with a debt or the use of the car as a home, transport for a 
disabled household member, and transportation for long distance travel for work. Id. 
88. See id. 
89. Overview Medicaid Program: General Information, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/ 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2010).  
90. Id.  
91. See Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Tem-
porary Assistance for Needy Families Program: Eighth Annual Report to Congress, 
at XII-101 to XII-102 tbl.12:6 (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/ 
data-reports/annualreport8/TANF_8th_Report_111908.pdf. 
92. Id.  
93. See Historical Data, supra note 63, at 189 tbl.4. The total employer contributions 
have grown each year since 1995. Id. The total employer contributions for tax year 1995 was 
$493.6 billion, and the employer contributions made during tax year 2005 was $927.7 bil-
lion. Id. 
94. Retirement Benefits: Access, Participation, and Take-Up Rates, U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (Mar. 2010), http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/ebs2.t01.htm.  
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percent of private industry workers with access to retirement bene-
fits is as follows:95  
 
Characteristics Defined Benefit or Defined  Contribution Plans 
Management, business and  
financial workers 85 
Natural resources, construction and 
maintenance workers 64 
Service occupations 42
Full-time 74
Part-time 39
Union 88
Non-union 62
Wages in the lowest 25 percentile 40
Wages in the highest 25 percentile 84
Goods producing 72
Service producing 63
1 to 99 workers 51
100 workers or more 81
 
As these statistics show, approximately 40% of workers in service 
industries, part-time workers, and workers earning wages in the 
lowest 25 percentile, and 51% of workers employed at small busi-
nesses have the opportunity to contribute to an employer 
retirement plan. This lack of access will continue to serve as a bar-
rier to saving for workers meeting these characteristics. 
2. Percentage of Employee Participation in Retirement  
Plans Based on Private Industry Workers 
In addition to the gap in access to private industry retirement 
plans, there is also a disparity in the actual percent of employees 
participating in these plans.96 For example, the participation rates 
for low-income employees remain low in comparison to higher in-
come employees. Only 20% of workers earning wages in the lowest 
25 percentile participate in employer retirement plans, while 75% 
of employees with earnings in the highest 25 percentile participate 
in employer retirement plans.97 Statistics from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics establish that a participation rate disparity also exists 
                                                   
95. Id.  
96. Id.  
97. See id. 
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based on whether the employee is a full-time or part-time worker. 
While 59% of full-time private industry employees participate in 
employer retirement plans, only 21% of part-time employees par-
ticipate.98 Moreover, only 23% of employees working in service oc-
occupations participate in employer retirement plans, compared to 
76% of management, business, and financial workers.99 
3. Percentage of Participation Based on Ethnic Group 
A recent study entitled the “Ariel/Hewitt Study” established that 
in fifty-seven of the largest businesses in the United States, 401(k) 
participation rates across racial and ethnic groups for individuals 
earning less than $30,000 were substantially lower than for individ-
uals earning a higher income.100 The participation rate for 
individuals in all ethnic groups earning less than $30,000 is be-
tween 50% and 56%, while the participation rate for individuals 
earning higher incomes ranges from 75% to 94%.101 The study 
concluded that African Americans and Hispanics had the lowest 
participation rates, while Caucasians and Asians had the highest 
participation rates.102 
V. The Earned Income Tax Credit 
A. Purpose of the EITC and Eligibility Requirements 
The EITC103 was enacted in 1975 to offset the impact of Social Se-
curity taxes, to provide an incentive for low-income individuals to 
work, “to stimulate the economy by funneling funds to persons likely 
to spend the money immediately, and to provide relief for low-
income families hurt by rising food and energy prices.”104 Congress 
                                                   
98. See id. 
99. See id. 
100. See The Ariel/Hewitt Study: A Study of 401(k) Savings Disparities Across Racial and  
Ethnic Groups, Ariel Invs., 4, http://www.arielinvestments.com/images/stories/PDF/ 
arielhewittslides_finalweb_7.3.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2010). 
101. See id. Approximately 3 million employees were included in the study, and the data 
was collected as of December 31, 2007. The Ariel/Hewitt Study: 401(k) Plans in Living Color, 
Ariel Invs. (July 7, 2009), http://www.arielinvestments.com/content/view/1223/1173 
[hereinafter Ariel/Hewitt Study].  
102. See Ariel/Hewitt Study, supra note 101. 
103. For an excellent discussion of the early history of the EITC, see Jonathan Barry 
Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working 
Poor, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 41 (1988).  
104. Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 864 (1986). 
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also enacted the credit to reduce the welfare rolls.105 Unlike many 
other credits,106 the EITC is refundable and a taxpayer receives the 
credit even if the taxpayer has no tax liability. It was intended to 
provide an incentive for low-income individuals to work by result-
ing in an increase of the worker’s after-tax income.107 The original 
EITC was allowed only for taxable year 1975.108 Congress then ex-
tended the credit for the first six months of 1976.109 The EITC 
became permanent in 1978.110  
The Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to claim the EITC 
when the taxpayer meets the eligibility requirements if the taxpay-
er has at least one qualifying child111 or is between the ages of 25 
and 65.112 Congress has made several modifications to the EITC 
since its enactment. As originally enacted in 1975, eligible recipi-
ents of the credit had to have a qualifying child.113 However, in 
1993 the federal government enacted a small credit for childless 
workers.114 The maximum EITC depends on the amount of the 
taxpayer’s earned income, the number of taxpayer’s qualifying 
children, credit percentage, and the taxpayer’s marital status. The 
maximum EITC is determined by multiplying the taxpayer’s 
earned income amount by a fixed percentage of earnings up to an 
earned income ceiling amount.115 Once the earned income reaches 
the threshold earned income phase-out, the credit is reduced by a 
                                                   
105. See S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 33 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54, 84 (“[T]he 
most significant objective of the provision should be to assist in encouraging people to ob-
tain employment, reducing the unemployment rate and reducing the welfare rolls.”). 
106. Nonrefundable credits include the Hope Scholarship Credit and Lifetime Learn-
ing Credit, child tax credit, credit for dependent care expenses, and the Saver’s Credit. See 
I.R.C. §§ 21, 24, 25A, 25B. 
107. S. Rep. No. 94-36, at 11. 
108. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 209, 89 Stat. 26, 35. 
109. Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-164, § 2, 89 Stat. 970, 971#72. 
110. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 103, 92 Stat. 2763, 2771. 
111. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(i). Per § 32(c)(3)(A), a “qualifying child” is defined under 
I.R.C. § 152(c). 
112. The taxpayer and any qualifying children must have Social Security numbers, the 
taxpayer cannot be a qualifying child or dependent for another taxpayer, the taxpayer’s 
principal place of abode must be in the United States for more than one-half of the taxable 
year, and the taxpayer cannot have investment income greater than a certain amount. I.R.C. 
§§ 32(c)(1)(A)(ii), 32(c)(1)(E), 32(i). For tax year 2009, the investment income cannot 
exceed $3100. Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1111.  
113. Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204. 
114. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131, 107 Stat. 
433, 433-35. 
115. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A). The credit percentage is 7.65% where the taxpayer does 
not have any qualifying children, 34% where the taxpayer has one child, and 40% where the 
taxpayer has two or more qualifying children. Id.  
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phase-out percentage until the credit is reduced to zero.116 The 
maximum credit and phase-out amounts for unmarried taxpayers 
for taxable year 2009 are as follows:117 
 
 No  
Children 
One  
Child 
Two  
Children 
Three or  
More Children 
Maximum EITC $457 $3,034 $5,028 $5,657 
Earned Income 
Amount $5,970 $8,950 $12,570 $12,570 
Threshold Earned 
Income Phaseout $7,470 $16,420 $16,420 $16,420 
Earned Income 
Ceiling Amount $13,440 $35,463 $40,295 $43,279 
 
Prior to taxable year 2009, the largest possible credit amount was 
granted to taxpayers with at least two children. The American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009 (ARRTA) temporarily 
increased the EITC for taxpayers with three or more children for 
taxable years 2009 and 2010.118 
Married taxpayers are also eligible to claim the EITC. In order 
for a married couple to claim the EITC, the couple must file a joint 
income tax return.119 The maximum credit and phase-out amounts 
for a married couple filing a joint return for taxable year 2009 are 
as follows:120 
 
 No  
Children 
One  
Child 
Two  
Children 
Three or  
More Children 
Maximum EITC $457 $3,034 $5,028 $5,657 
Required Earned 
Income $5,970 $8,950 $12,570 $12,570 
Threshold Earned 
Income Phaseout $12,470 $21,420 $21,420 $21,420 
Earned Income 
Ceiling Amount $18,440 $40,463 $45,295 $48,279 
                                                   
116. The phaseout percentage is 7.65% where the taxpayer does not have any qualify-
ing children, 15.98% where the taxpayer has one child, and 21.06% where the taxpayer has 
two or more qualifying children. Id.  
117. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862. 
118. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1002, 123 
Stat. 115, 312. 
119. See I.R.C. § 32(d). A taxpayer is entitled to file as “head of household” and claim 
the EITC because the taxpayer is considered to be “unmarried.” To qualify, the taxpayer 
must be legally separated from the taxpayer’s spouse or if the spouse is not a member of the 
taxpayer’s household during the last six months of the year, the taxpayer paid more than 
one-half the cost of maintaining a home and the home is a child’s principal place of abode. 
See I.R.C. § 7703 (2006).  
120. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862. 
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A married couple may be precluded from claiming the credit 
because of the so-called marriage penalty.121 A marriage penalty is 
imposed because the statute does not adequately adjust for dual 
income. An unmarried couple with dual income and children will 
be entitled to a greater EITC than a similarly situated married 
couple. For example, for an unmarried couple with two children, 
where each parent earns $14,000 in wages and each parent claims 
a child as an exemption and for EITC purposes for taxable year 
2009, each parent will receive the maximum EITC of $3043122 for a 
combined EITC of $6086. In contrast, due to the marriage penalty, 
a married couple with two children receives a smaller EITC. Nu-
merous scholars have argued that Congress should amend the 
credit to alleviate the marriage tax penalty,123 and ARRTA finally 
lessened the severity of the marriage tax penalty by increasing the 
phase-out amounts by $5000.124 Even after the amendment, howev-
er, the married couple’s EITC is only $3642,125 substantially less 
than the combined EITC of $6086 for the unmarried couple. As a 
result, there remains a substantial marriage penalty under the 
EITC.  
                                                   
121. Many scholars have discussed the EITC’s marriage penalty. See, e.g., Dorothy A. 
Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but Unequal, 54 Emory L.J. 755, 769, 806–07 
(2005); Danshera Cords, Paid Tax Preparers, Used Car Dealers, Refund Anticipation Loans, and 
the Earned Income Tax Credit: The Need to Regulate Tax Return Preparers and Provide More Free 
Alternatives, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 351, 357–59 (2009); George K. Yin, Accommodating the 
“Low-Income” in a Cash-Flow or Consumed Income Tax World, 2 Fla. Tax Rev. 445, 477 (1995). 
122. The EITC is computed by multiplying the earned income limitation amount by a 
credit percentage, which is 7.65% for eligible taxpayers with no qualifying children, 34% for 
taxpayers with one qualifying child, 40% for taxpayers with two qualifying children, and 
beginning in 2009, 45% for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children. I.R.C. 
§ 32(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2010). For the unmarried couple, the credit for each filer is 
determined by multiplying the earned income amount of $8950 by 34%. That figure equals 
the credit amount of $3043.  
123. See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Changing the Subject: From Welfare to a Living Income, 4 
Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 14, 22 (2009) (stating that the credit needed further improvement by 
easing the marriage penalty); Forman, supra note 103, at 93#95 (exploring several options 
which would reduce the marriage penalty); Wendy Richards, Comment, An Analysis of Recent 
Tax Reforms from a Marital-Bias Perspective: It Is Time to Oust Marriage from the Tax Code, 2008 
Wis. L. Rev. 611, 627#28 (stating marriage penalty discourages taxpayers from working full 
time and counters the EITC goals).  
124. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862. 
125. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A). The computation of the EITC for the married couple is 
more complicated because their earned income exceeds the threshold earned income 
phaseout. The earned income amount of $12,570 is multiplied by 40% for a maximum EITC 
before the phaseout of $5028. The threshold earned income phaseout is $21,420. Hence, 
the married couple’s $28,000 earned income exceeds the threshold earned income amount 
by $6580. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A), the EITC before phaseout must be reduced by 
$1386 ($6580 times the phaseout percentage of 21.06). Consequently, the EITC for the 
married couple is $3642.  
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Currently, 24 states have also enacted the EITC at the state lev-
el.126 The state EITC provisions vary among states. The states that 
have enacted an EITC determine its amount based on a percent-
age of the federal EITC, ranging from 3.5% to 50%.127 While most 
of the states that have enacted the EITC allow for a refundable 
credit,128 or a partially refundable credit,129 a few states do not per-
mit an EITC where the taxpayer does not have a tax liability.130 In 
addition, most states are consistent with the federal EITC and allow 
an EITC for childless workers, Wisconsin being the sole state that 
                                                   
126. See Jason Levitis & Jeremy Koulish, State Earned Income Tax Credits: 2008 Legislative 
Update, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, 1 (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.cbpp.org/files/ 
6-6-08sfp1.pdf. 
127. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1117(a) (2009) (providing a credit of 20% of the 
federal EITC); D.C. Code § 47-1806.04(f)(1) (2009) (providing a 40% credit of the federal 
EITC); 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/212(a) (West 2009) (granting a state EITC of 5% of the 
federal EITC); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-3.1-21-6(a) (West 2009) (allowing a state credit equal to 9% 
of the federal credit); Iowa Code § 422.12B(1) (2008) (providing a credit of 7% of the federal 
EITC); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-32,205(a) (2008) (allowing a state credit of 17% of federal EITC); 
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:297.8(a) (2009) (granting a credit equal to 3.5% of the federal cred-
it); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 5219-S(1) (2009) (granting a state credit equal to 4% of 
federal credit); Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-704(b)(1) (West 2009) (providing a credit 
equal to the lesser of 50% of the federal EITC or the state tax liability); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
62, § 6(h) (2009) (granting a state EITC of 15% of the federal credit); Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 206.272(1)(b) (West 2009) (increasing the state EITC to 20% of federal credit for taxa-
ble years beginning 2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2715.07(2)(e) (2009) (granting a credit to 
workers equal to 10% of the federal credit); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54A:4-7(a)(2)(f) (West 2009) 
(establishing a credit equal to 25% of the federal credit beginning in taxable year 2009); N.M. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-2-18.15(A) (2008) (providing a working families tax credit of 10% of the federal 
EITC); N.Y. Tax Law § 606 (d)(1)(vii) (McKinney 2009) (granting a state EITC equal to 30% 
of the federal EITC); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-151.31(a)-(c) (2009) (granting a credit equal to 
5% of the federal EITC beginning in 2009 but scheduled to sunset in taxable year 2013); 
Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2357.43 (2009) (providing a credit equal to 5% of the federal EITC); Or. 
Rev. Stat. § 315.266(1) (2009) (allowing a credit of 6% of the federal EITC); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 44-30-2.6(N)(1) (2009) (granting a credit of 25% of the federal EITC); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, 
§ 5828b(a) (2009) (allowing of credit of 32% of the federal EITC); Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-339.8 
(B)(2) (2009) (providing a credit of 20% of the federal EITC); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 82.08.0206(3) (West 2009) (granting greater of ten% of the federal EITC or fifty dollars); 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.07(9e)(af) (West 2009) (granting a credit based upon the number of 
qualifying children of 4%, 14%, or 43% of the federal EITC). But see Minn. Stat. 
§ 290.0671(1) (2009) (basing its working family credit on a percentage of earned income).  
128. D.C. Code § 47-1806.04(f)(3); 35 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/212(b); Ind. Code 
Ann. § 6-3.1-21-6(b); Iowa Code § 422.12B(1); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-32,205(b); La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 47:297.8(b); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 62, § 6(h); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 206.272(2); Minn. Stat. § 290.0671(4); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2715.07; N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 54A:4-7(c); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2-18.15(B); N.Y. Tax Law § 606 (d)(2); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 105-151.31(b); Okla. Stat. tit. 68, § 2357.43; Or. Rev. Stat. § 315.266(5) (2007); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 32 § 5828b(b); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.07(9e)(f).  
129. Md. Code Ann., Tax-Gen. § 10-704(b) (granting either a refundable credit of 50% 
or a nonrefundable credit equal to 25% of the federal credit); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-30-
2.6(N)(1) (providing for a refundable credit of 15% of its 25% credit).  
130. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1117(a); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 5219-S(4); Va. 
Code Ann. § 58.1-339.8(C). 
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requires recipients to have at least one dependent child.131 Interest-
ingly, the state of Washington, which has no state income tax, still 
provides a state refundable EITC equal to the greater of 5% of the 
federal EITC, or $25 in taxable years 2009 and 2010, and the 
greater of 10% of the federal EITC, or $50 for 2011 and subse-
quent years.132  
B. Problems with the Tax Credit 
One large problem with the EITC is that eligible taxpayers ne-
glect to claim it. The IRS estimates that approximately 25% of 
eligible taxpayers fail to claim the EITC because they are unaware 
that they qualify to receive the credit.133 Another frequent problem 
with the administration of the EITC is the high level of erroneous 
claims. During taxable year 1999, 27% to 31.7% of the $8.4 billion 
to $9.9 billion of EITC claims were erroneous.134 The erroneous 
claims result from several common mistakes. The IRS has disal-
lowed the EITC when a married couple failed to file a joint 
return.135 On numerous tax returns, taxpayers attempt to claim the 
earned income tax credit on the basis of having a qualifying child. 
The courts have frequently sustained the IRS’s denial of the credit 
where a child is not a qualifying child for purposes of the credit.136  
One possible explanation for taxpayer’s reporting of an ineligi-
ble child for EITC purposes is that there have traditionally been 
inconsistent rules pertaining to whether a taxpayer is entitled to 
the dependency exemption, child tax credit, head of household 
                                                   
131. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.07(9e).  
132. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 82.08.0206(3). 
133. I.R.S. News Release IR-2008-13 (Jan. 31, 2008). 
134. I.R.S. News Release IR-2003-78 (June 13, 2003). 
135. See, e.g., McCullough v. Comm’r, No. 14718-04S (T.C. Feb. 21, 2006) (finding that 
taxpayer not allowed to amend improperly filed head of household status to married filing 
jointly after taxpayer filed a petition with the Tax Court); Newsom v. Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 415 (1999) (finding that EITC disallowed where husband and wife filed separate tax 
returns after husband originally filed as a head of household); Mischel v. Comm’r, 74 
T.C.M. (CCH) 253 (1997) (finding that EITC disallowed because the married taxpayer did 
not file a joint income tax return). 
136. See, e.g., Willoughby v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M (CCH) 1302 (2009) (denying credit 
where the taxpayer attempted to claim his live-in girlfriend’s daughters as qualifying chil-
dren); Redmond v. Comm’r, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) 414 (2008) (denying credit because taxpayer 
did not meet her burden that two children were her niece and nephew); Linton v. Comm’r, 
85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1436 (2003) (finding taxpayer ineligible to claim children for purposes of 
the EITC because they did not reside with the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxa-
ble year). 
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filing status, and EITC.137 The Working Families Tax Relief Act of 
2004138 alleviated some of this inconsistency by creating a uniform 
definition of the term “qualifying child,” but did not completely 
eliminate the problem of confusion over inconsistent rules. For 
example, a taxpayer is entitled to utilize the head of household 
filing status and claim a dependency exemption for a “qualifying 
relative,” 139 but the taxpayer is not entitled to claim such person for 
purposes of the EITC and child tax credit. Consequently, a taxpay-
er can claim an eligible non-relative who resided with the taxpayer 
for the entire taxable year for purposes of the dependency exemp-
tion, but that taxpayer is unable to claim that non-relative for 
purposes of the EITC.140 In addition, the child tax credit is inappli-
cable for a child who turned 17 by the end of the tax year,141 but for 
purposes of the EITC, dependency exemption, and head of 
household filing status, the maximum age is generally under the 
age of nineteen.142 For purposes of the EITC, dependency exemp-
tion, and head of household filing status, the maximum age is 
under twenty-four if the taxpayer’s qualifying child is a full-time 
student.143 There is no maximum age where the child is perma-
nently or totally disabled.144  
While there are several reasons for erroneous EITC claims,145 Pro-
fessor Dorothy Brown has argued that one of the core explanations 
is that the IRS and politicians have unfairly targeted the low-income 
recipients because they are considered to be pseudo welfare recipi-
ents.146 Professor Brown states that “[t]he belief that EITC errors are 
the result of fraud and not complexity is a function of the mental 
                                                   
137. In Olivio v. Commissioner, No. 311-07S (T.C. Sept. 8, 2008), the 22-year old taxpayer 
properly claimed the dependency exemption for a cousin whose parents lived in the Domin-
ican Republic, but the taxpayer was not entitled to the EITC because the cousin was not a 
qualifying child. Similarly, in Hartfield v. Commissioner, No. 7439-05S (T.C. May 11, 2006), the 
Tax Court concluded that although the taxpayer was entitled to claim the dependency ex-
emption for his girlfriend’s child because he met the residency and support tests, he was not 
able to claim the child for purposes of the EITC. 
138. Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-311, § 201, 118 Stat. 
1166, 1169–71. 
139. See I.R.C. § 152(d). 
140. A non-relative is not a qualifying child for purposes of the child tax credit. See id. 
§ 24(c). 
141. Id. § 24(c)(1). 
142. See id. §§ 32(c)(3), 152(c)(3)(A)(i).  
143. See id. § 152(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
144. See id. § 152(c)(3)(B). 
145. Professor Leslie Book analyzed several factors contributing to EITC noncompli-
ance based on categories of taxpayer behavior and argued that the IRS must focus on these 
categories rather than the error rate. Leslie Book, The Poor and Tax Compliance: One Size Does 
Not Fit All, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1145, 1177#78 (2003).  
146. Brown, supra note 22, at 800-01.  
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connection between EITC recipients and welfare recipients.”147 
These errors are uncovered because approximately 50% of all indi-
vidual tax return audits are those in which the taxpayer claimed 
the EITC rather than higher income taxpayers.148 According to 
Professor Brown, the premise that errors are attributable to fraud 
is based on critical race issues and the faulty perception that Afri-
can Americans and Hispanics are the primary EITC claimants.149  
Professor Forman has identified additional problems with the 
EITC. He argues that the EITC should be converted from an 
earned income credit to a wage subsidy credit because the current 
tax incentive not only provides benefits to high-wage individuals, 
but also because these benefits exceed those provided to low-wage 
earners.150 One problem he identifies is that there is not necessarily 
horizontal equity151 between two workers where one of the workers 
works half of the hours that the other worker works but earns dou-
ble the hourly rate, particularly where the worker with the higher 
                                                   
147. Id. at 806-07.  
148. Id. at 808. Professor Brown also discusses the precertification requirement for 
25,000 EITC claimants implemented by the IRS beginning in 2004 that required these 
claimants to provide eligibility documentation in order to receive the EITC. Id. at 809#10; see 
also Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit Compliance and Treatment 
of the Working Poor, 6 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J. 183, 190 (2007) (finding that the audit rate for 
high income taxpayers has increased but audits of EITC claimants remains substantially 
higher); James L. Rockney, Note, Prove It or Lose It: The Certification Program for Select Individu-
als Claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit, 2 Pitt. Tax Rev. 49, 60 (2004) (discussing the 
precertification requirement resulting in audits of a random sample of taxpayers claiming 
the EITC and noting that “in all fairness . . . [the IRS] should also tailor a certification pro-
gram for those other taxpayers in higher brackets who have historically abused the tax 
system and amassed fortunes with tax avoidance schemes”). But see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., 
Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the EITC, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 1261, 1275 (2007) 
(“To the extent a small number of EITC claimants are required to precertify their eligibility 
for benefits, or that otherwise EITC eligibles shown to have made erroneous claims in previ-
ous years are prevented from claiming the EITC for as many as ten years (for fraud), is, to 
my mind, a realistic price to pay.” (footnote omitted)). A recent New York Times article 
supports the conclusion that the government could benefit by auditing the tax returns of 
wealthy taxpayers. In the article, it was reported that a former chief executive of an account-
ing firm was indicted for selling bogus tax shelters to wealthy taxpayers costing the 
government billions of dollars in tax losses between 1994 and 2004 and $3.9 billion from 
1998 to 2000. Lynnley Browning, 7 Indicted on Charges of Selling Tax Shelters, N.Y. Times, June 
10, 2009, at B1.  
149. Brown, supra note 22, at 824. But see Bekah Mandell, Race and State-Level Earned In-
come Tax Credits: Another Case of Welfare Racism?, 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 1, 19#23 (2008) 
(outlining several factors to establish that people of color disproportionately receive the 
EITC including low-wage jobs, larger family sizes, higher single parent families, and high 
concentration in the south where there are lower wages).  
150. Forman, supra note 103, at 81.  
151. One of the goals of the income tax is horizontal equity. Under horizontal equity 
principles, similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, 
Theories of Tax Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership, and Ability-to-Pay Principles, 58 
Tax L. Rev. 399, 401 (2005). 
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rate works fewer hours because of “labor-leisure choices.”152 He pos-
its that “a net worth or resources test” for determining the EITC 
phase-out may provide a better solution because it prevents an in-
dividual with little earned income but a high net worth from 
claiming the credit consistent with “typical welfare programs” such 
as the Aid for Dependent Children program.153  
An additional problem indirectly impacting the EITC tax incen-
tive is the substantial transfer of benefits to tax preparers and rapid 
loan providers. Many low-income workers fall prey to the allure of 
rapid refunds offered by some paid preparers for hefty fees. Evi-
dence establishes that approximately $2 billion of EITC claims are 
paid to paid preparers and loan providers, resulting in a 6.7% loss 
of EITC benefits to the low-income claimant.154 Because of limited 
financial services, low-income individuals are easy targets for re-
fund-anticipation loans and other services such as rent-to-own 
transactions, pawn shops, and check cashing outlets.155 Additional 
regulation of return preparation is necessary to reduce the sub-
stantial EITC benefits paid to preparers and loan providers.156 With 
free electronic filing and return preparation available through the 
IRS’s VITA program, it is troubling that many low-income workers 
unnecessarily relinquish a portion of their EITC to paid preparers 
for high-interest rapid refunds.  
                                                   
152. Forman, supra note 103, at 81.  
153. Id. at 88.  
154. Rockney, supra note 148, at 58. Another concluded that “loans with triple-digit in-
terest rates are now attached to nearly half of all EITC refund dollars. Overall, roughly $1.75 
billion intended to benefit low-income families flows instead to commercial tax preparers 
and affiliated national banks.” Silverman, supra note 82, at 490 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
155. See Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2041, 2076#77 
(2009) (stating “that most rent-to-own customers have low incomes” and that the “APR is 
frequently above 200 percent”); Silverman, supra note 82, at 486-89 (stating that the working 
poor rely on a second-tier financial system that includes pawnshops, check cashing outlets, 
rent-to-own stores, and tax refund anticipation lenders); see also Lois R. Lupica, The Consumer 
Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of Class Position, 40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 557, 593#94 (2009) 
(“Borrowers who are driven by need, however, know that payday lenders are exploiting them, 
that credit cards are a trap, and that rent-to-own stores are a rip-off, but in the face of such 
dire need, the price of credit and the effects of indebtedness become irrelevant. In the absence 
of alternatives, these borrowers do not have the luxury to meaningfully consider the long-term 
consequences of incurring high priced debt.” (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted)); 
Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 Chap. L. Rev. 79, 83 (2000) (stating that the 
regulation of the credit card industry could have negative consequences on low-income indi-
viduals because they might be driven back to pawnbrokers, rent-to-own establishments, and 
loan sharks).  
156. See Cords, supra note 121, at 355 (advocating that increased regulation of tax pre-
parers and oversight of loan providers are necessary). See generally Michele Estrin Gilman, 
Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 
721, 813 (2005) (stating the flaw that “the low-wage population is preyed upon by tax pre-
parers who take a hefty share of the tax credit” needs to be corrected).  
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Finally, the current EITC provisions do not encourage recipients 
to save a portion of their EITC benefits. Unlike other government 
transfer programs, “families who receive the EITC experience a 
greater freedom and increased potential to invest in long-term 
purchases and equities, enabling them to reduce their vulnerabil-
ity.”157 While the legislative history indicates that one purpose of the 
tax incentive is to “funnel[] funds to persons likely to spend the 
money immediately,” it also states that the credit is intended to 
provide relief for individuals hurt by inflationary food and energy 
costs.158 The EITC needs to incorporate a savings component to 
ensure recipients can sustain payment for such necessities upon 
retirement. As already discussed in this Article, the government 
promotes low-income individuals to save in other ways, but there 
are several limitations on those efforts. 
VI. Adding a Saving Component to the EITC  
A. In General 
This section will outline a proposal to amend the Internal Reve-
nue Code to increase the incentive for the working poor and other 
low-income workers to save for retirement. President Barack 
Obama’s budget includes proposals to increase the savings rate of 
low-income and middle income workers. His budget includes an 
expansion of the saver’s credit by making it refundable, mandating 
that employers automatically enroll employees in their retirement 
plans, and requiring employers who do not offer retirement plans 
to enroll employees in direct-deposit IRAs.159 The President’s pro-
posal also suggests converting the saver’s credit to a refundable one 
with a 50% match on $1000 of savings for families earning less than 
$65,000.160 The Obama administration estimates that implementa-
tion of the proposal will increase the participation rate of these 
workers to 80%.161 Even if Congress enacts President Obama’s pro-
posal, Congress should still add a savings component to the EITC 
                                                   
157. Mandell, supra note 149, at 19.  
158. Sorenson v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 864 (1986). 
159. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing Ameri-
ca’s Promise 84#85 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/ 
fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf. Senator Jeff Bingaman recently intro-
duced a bill into the Senate to require employers without qualified plans to automatically 
enroll their employees into IRAs subject to employee opt out. See Automatic IRA Act of 
2010, S. 3760, 111th Cong. § 2(a) (2010). 
160. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 159, at 85. 
161. Id. 
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because it does not address many of the challenges that low-
income individuals have in saving for retirement.  
B. Proposed Expansion of the EITC  
1. In General  
The EITC has gained nonpartisan support and represents an in-
tegral component of tax policy. Empirical data indicates that the 
majority of EITC benefits is used to pay bills, but that 49% of recip-
ients save a portion of the credit to purchase a car or home or save 
for education.162 However, as already noted, the EITC has its share 
of shortcomings. In light of these shortcomings, scholars have pro-
posed modifications to the EITC. One interesting proposal is to 
expand the EITC to reach more low-income workers who do not 
have qualifying children because they frequently financially sup-
port noncustodial children and pay a large percentage of their 
income in payroll, sales, and excise taxes.163 That proposal also ar-
gues that the EITC should be expanded to these low-income 
workers to promote saving for education and retirement.164 The 
rationale for this proposal is as follows: 
With the national savings rate at zero, innovative approaches 
that promote savings and asset building for all low-income 
workers deserve support. The current tax structure favors as-
set building among middle and upper income families, but 
has too little to offer those with low incomes and low tax lia-
bilities. . . . An expanded EITC linked to opportunities for 
single low-wage workers to save and build assets could achieve 
a number of worthwhile social policy goals, including financ-
ing primary and secondary educations for the children of 
non-custodial parents as well as reducing the number of peo-
ple facing poverty in retirement.165 
I agree that the scope of the EITC should be expanded to im-
plement the objective of saving for retirement.166 However, the 
expansion should not be limited to low-income workers who lack 
                                                   
162. Mandell, supra note 149, at 18 (citing Timothy M. Smeeding et al., The EITC: Expec-
tation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility, 53 Nat’l Tax J. 1187, 1203 (2000)).  
163. Gitterman et al., supra note 29, at 249-50. 
164. Id. at 248. 
165. Id. at 249.  
166. Cf. Smeeding, supra note 14, at 18 (“Clearly there is potential for the EITC to be 
linked to asset-building policy.”).  
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qualifying children. A portion of a taxpayer’s EITC should be con-
tributed to a retirement savings vehicle. The fact that many 
taxpayers lack access to retirement accounts should not prevent 
implementation of this proposal. President Obama’s proposal to 
require employers to enroll employees in a direct-deposit IRA if 
the employer lacks a retirement plan is worth consideration. In 
addition, the federal government already has a template in place to 
solve the problem of lack of access to retirement accounts: the 
Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). The TSP was created under the Federal 
Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986.167 As originally enacted, 
the TSP was a program for Federal civilian employees only; howev-
er, beginning with fiscal year 2001, it was extended to members of 
the military.168 The Thrift Savings Plan Enhancement Act of 2009 
made several additional changes to the TSP, including: 1) ending 
the one year waiting period for Agency contributions in order to 
enable employees to immediately receive a one percent automatic 
Agency contribution and potentially an Agency match; 2) creating 
automatic enrollment for civilian employees, but not for military 
personnel; 3) allowing a deceased participant’s spouse to leave sav-
ings in the TSP account instead of requiring mandatory 
withdrawal; 4) allowing participants to contribute after-tax dollars 
to the TSP and avoid tax on earnings consistent with Roth IRAs; 
and 5) allowing (but not requiring) participants the opportunity to 
invest in a variety of mutual funds selected by the Agency.169 While 
the current TSP only covers federal government employees and 
members of the military, Congress could either extend the TSP to 
EITC recipients or establish a similar vehicle for the program. Be-
cause of the barriers to savings for low-income workers, including 
lack of access to retirement plans and lack of investment savvy, the 
creation of a program similar to the TSP or the requirement that 
employers enroll employees in a direct-deposit IRA where the em-
ployer lacks a retirement plan is critical to the success of the 
expansion of the EITC. 
                                                   
167. Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-335, § 206, 100 
Stat. 514, 593-94. 
168. Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 106-398, § 661, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-167 (2000). 
169. See Legislative Changes to the Thrift Savings Plan, Thrift Savings Plan, 1–2 (Aug. 
2009), https://www.tsp.gov/PDF/formspubs/oc09-16.pdf. 
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2. Basic Structure of a Revamped EITC 
a. Investment Income Restriction 
The EITC statutory scheme prohibits a recipient from claiming 
the credit where investment income exceeds $3100 for the taxable 
year.170 Investment income includes taxable and tax-exempt inter-
est, dividends, net rents, net royalties, net capital gains, and passive 
activity income to the extent that it exceeds passive activity losses.171 
According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, individuals with 
meaningful assets can dispose of them to purchase consumable 
products.172 In addition, Medicaid, Supplemental Nutrition Assis-
tance Program, and other government programs have asset tests to 
determine eligibility and rely on caseworkers to determine eligibil-
ity.173  
Because interest, dividends, rents, and royalties are derived from 
assets, they serve as “a proxy for an asset-based test” for determin-
ing EITC eligibility.174 Consequently, a low-income individual whose 
assets generate substantial income is unable to receive the EITC 
tax subsidy. However, the legislative history is devoid of any indica-
tion that this proxy applies to assets held in retirement savings 
accounts. The expansion of the EITC program to encourage re-
tirement savings is not inconsistent with the reasons underlying the 
excess investment income prohibition. The investment income re-
striction therefore should remain in force but should not apply to 
any retirement savings or any accrued earnings from such savings.  
b. Necessity of Automatic Contributions 
Neoclassical economists support individual choice rather than a 
policy of paternalism that is typical in many employer benefit plans 
because they allow for the least amount of individual choice.175 The 
greatest range of choices is superior to more limited choices be-
cause an individual has a greater opportunity to select the optimal 
                                                   
170. See Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1111. 
171. I.R.C. § 32(i)(2).  
172. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th Congress, General Explanation 
of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 104th Congress 390 (Comm. Print 1996), available 
at http://www.jct.gov/s-12-96.pdf. 
173. Id.  
174. Id.  
175. See Weiss, supra note 46, at 1289.  
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choice.176 According to this approach, the decision to save or con-
sume is an example of rational human behavior.177 Neoclassical 
economists also consider extremely low levels of saving to be ra-
tional.178 However, neoclassical economists recognize that some 
restriction on individual choice may be necessary because “savings 
affects the welfare of future generations.”179 
In contrast to the neoclassical economic theory, the proposal to 
modify the EITC is based on the choice architecture theory ad-
vanced by Professors Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein. 
Under this theory, a choice architect influences behavior by de-
signing the available options for a decision maker.180 The choice 
architect attempts to persuade, or “nudge,” people to make certain 
choices that the architect perceives to be beneficial for those peo-
ple.181 The decision to contribute to a retirement savings plan 
presents an individual with a choice and a consequence that are 
separated in time. According to choice architecture theory, indi-
viduals need “nudges” for these types of decisions because they do 
not get “prompt feedback.”182  
Offering a “nudge” can have a profound impact in encouraging 
the working poor and other low-income workers to invest in re-
tirement savings. The employer match has not succeeded in 
increasing the participation rate of the working poor and other 
low-income workers.183 Therefore, an additional nudge may be re-
quired to increase their retirement savings.  
The creation of automatic enrollment programs may provide 
the nudge for some workers to save for retirement.184 The Pension 
Protection Act of 2006185 (PPA) created a safe harbor for employers 
who wanted to establish automatic enrollment programs for their 
employees. Prior to 2006, automatic enrollment was possible, but 
many employers did not utilize it because of perceived “potential 
                                                   
176. See Matthew Venhorst, Note, Helping Individual Investors Do What They Know Is Right: 
The Save More for Retirement Act of 2005, 13 Conn. Ins. L.J. 113, 127 (2006–2007).  
177. See Weiss, supra note 46, at 1286. 
178. Id. at 1298.  
179. Id. at 1291.  
180. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 3. 
181. Id. at 6. Professors Thaler and Sunstein define a nudge as “any aspect of the choice 
architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any op-
tions or significantly changing their economic incentives.” Id. 
182. Id. at 74. 
183. See id. at 109. 
184. See id. at 110. 
185. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 1033#40. 
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legal liability.”186 The PPA details how employers can automatically 
enroll their employees in a retirement plan while meeting ERISA’s 
nondiscrimination rules.187 The PPA does not mandate automatic 
enrollment, but it provides an incentive for its use by giving em-
ployers the ability to automatically enroll their employees in 
retirement plans without fear of violations of ERISA. Under the 
PPA, the retirement plan administrator must provide notice of the 
employee’s rights to eligible employees within a reasonable time 
period before each plan year.188 The plan must have an opt-out fea-
ture, and the notice must clearly explain that feature. It must also 
include a description of investment options to the extent that the 
plan contains such options. 
In addition, the IRS facilitates automatic enrollment by provid-
ing sample amendments that can assist employers, plan sponsors, 
and practitioners in establishing an automatic enrollment feature 
to retirement plans.189 The sample amendments are designed to aid 
in the drafting of an automatic enrollment plan and are intended 
to allow for modifications to comport with the plan’s terms and 
procedures.190 They provide employers with sample language that 
outlines the specifics of automatic enrollment into an employer 
plan, including the default percentage, annual increases to the de-
fault percentage up to a cap, and mandatory notice requirements 
that allow for an employee to opt out of the automatic enrollment 
or to elect a different percentage to be invested in the plan.191 
Participation in automatic enrollment plans has been increasing 
since the enactment of the PPA. According to a survey conducted 
by the Profit Sharing/401K Council of America, participation in 
automatic enrollment plans increased from 23.6% in 2006 to 
35.6% in 2007.192 However, in the case of low-income workers, the 
automatic enrollment feature alone will not sufficiently increase 
their retirement savings because of the lack of access to employer 
retirement plans.  
                                                   
186. EBRI Policy Forum: Defined Contribution Plans in a Post-PPA Environment, EBRI Notes 
(Emp. Benefit Res. Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 2008, at 2, 2, available at 
http://ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_07-2008.pdf. 
187. Under ERISA, there are standards and percentages for determining whether there 
is discrimination between the “highly compensated employees” and all other employees. See 
I.R.C. § 401(k)(3)(A)(ii). 
188. Pension Protection Act of 2006 § 501.  
189. See I.R.S. Notice 2009-65, 2009-39 I.R.B. 413-18. 
190. See id. 
191. Id.  
192. David Wray & Hattie Greenan, Survey Finds Growing 401(k) Success, Defined Contri-
butions Insight Magazine, Nov./Dec. 2008, http://www.psca.org/DCIMagazineMembers/ 
tabid/133/ctl/Detail/mid/490/Id/1024/Archive/Default.aspx. 
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Where a low-income employee lacks access, I propose that the 
automatic enrollment feature should be tied to an investment ve-
hicle similar to the TSP or to an IRA in order to increase 
retirement savings for the low-income worker. In order to imple-
ment the automatic enrollment feature, 10% of the recipient’s 
EITC subsidy should be allocated to the retirement savings ac-
count. Based on the maximum EITC benefits for taxable year 2009, 
the amount of the benefits to be refunded to the recipient and au-
tomatically contributed to a retirement savings account are as 
follows:193  
 
 No  
Children 
One  
Child 
Two  
Children 
Three or  
More Children 
Maximum EITC $457.00 $3,034.00 $5,028.00 $5,657.00 
EITC to be refunded 
to employee $411.30 $2,730.60 $4,525.20 $5,091.30 
EITC to retirement 
account $ 45.70 $303.40 $502.80 $565.70 
 
These figures show that the primary objective of the EITC will 
not be frustrated by the automatic allocation of 10% of the EITC to 
a retirement savings account. The amount of the EITC benefits to 
be refunded to the recipient will continue to represent a substan-
tial increase in the recipient’s after-tax income. Moreover, the 
EITC benefits will be supplemented by other refundable credits, 
such as the additional child tax credit.194  
c. Matching Component 
Under my proposal, the maximum amount that can be allocated 
to a retirement savings account under the EITC is $1000 for single 
taxpayers and $2000 for married taxpayers filing a joint return. 
These figures are identical to the maximum allowable saver’s cred-
it. This amount is only available where the EITC recipient 
contributes an amount in excess of the automatic contribution 
from the EITC benefits. To the extent that an EITC recipient con-
tributes money to an existing IRA or 401(k) retirement plan or 
elects to contribute an additional portion of the EITC benefits in 
excess of the automatic contribution during the current taxable 
year, the recipient should be entitled to a match from the govern-
ment. The match should be dollar for dollar. The purpose of the 
                                                   
193. Rev. Proc. 2009-21, 2009-16 I.R.B. 862. 
194. See I.R.C. § 24(d). 
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match is to provide an additional incentive for the EITC recipient 
to contribute additional money to a retirement account.  
The match is illustrated in the following example. If a single 
taxpayer with one child is entitled to the maximum EITC of $3034, 
declines to opt out of the automatic 10% contribution, and con-
tributes an additional $300 under an established 401(k) account or 
IRA, that taxpayer will receive a total government subsidy of 
$603.40 ($303.40 from the automatic contribution plus a match of 
$300). Consequently, the taxpayer will have a total amount of 
$903.40 contributed to a retirement account but only $300 is con-
tributed from the taxpayer’s wages. Alternatively, if the same 
taxpayer does not opt out of the automatic contribution and elects 
to have an additional 10% of the EITC benefits contributed to a 
retirement account or IRA but does not make an additional con-
tribution to the retirement account, the total amount contributed 
on behalf of the taxpayer is $910.20 ($303.40 from the automatic 
contribution, $303.40 additional contribution from the EITC, and 
$303.40 from the match).  
d. Role of Vesting 
As noted above, with a qualified employer plan, employer con-
tributions cannot be forfeited once the employee meets the vesting 
requirements.195 The question arises as to whether vesting should 
be applicable to the portion of EITC benefits that are contributed 
to a retirement savings account. In the context of the EITC match, 
the question is based on the length of time in which the contribu-
tion was held in a retirement account rather than length of service. 
In other words, should an EITC recipient who has received a 
match from the government forfeit it or a portion thereof if he or 
she withdraws funds from the retirement savings account within a 
certain period of time prior to reaching retirement age? I propose 
that the EITC recipient should be fully vested in any automatic 
contribution of EITC benefits to a retirement plan or IRA; if the 
EITC recipient is not fully vested in these contributions, it will se-
verely limit the participation level in the proposed program. 
However, to protect the purpose of the proposed plan, the vesting 
rules must apply to any match contributed by the government. 
Under the vesting rules, the EITC recipient must forfeit the match 
to the extent that automatic contributions or additional contribu-
tions are withdrawn prior to the end of the vesting period.  
                                                   
195. See supra notes 50–51 and the accompanying text.  
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Because the expanded EITC is more consistent with a defined 
contribution plan, one of its vesting schedules should be applied. 
The vesting schedule requiring 20% vesting two years after the 
contribution and 20% increases each year for six years after the 
contribution is more consistent with the purpose of encouraging 
long-term saving. In order to implement this exception, a system of 
“first in, first out” (also known as the accounting principle “FIFO”) 
should be adopted. For example, assume that $500 is contributed 
to a retirement savings account each year from an automatic con-
tribution of $250 and an additional contribution of $250 by the 
EITC recipient. The government provides a dollar for dollar match 
of $250 each year. Excluding gains, the participant will have $1500 
in the retirement account after the recipient’s contributions and 
the government match. If the participant withdraws $700 after 
making the contributions in the second year, $500 is taken from 
the contribution made in year one first, and the full $250 match 
from the first year of participation is forfeited. The $200 balance of 
the withdrawal is taken from the EITC recipient’s contribution 
made during the second year, and $200 of the match from the se-
cond year is also lost. Because the EITC recipient has withdrawn 
80% of the remaining automatic or additional contribution, the 
recipient also forfeits 80% of the match. The EITC recipient still 
has $350 in the retirement account, and the recipient will be 20% 
vested in the remaining match of $50 two years after the contribu-
tion. The following table outlines these principles: 
 
 Year One Contributions and 
Match 
Year Two Contributions and 
Match 
Automatic Contribution $250 $250 
Additional Contribution $250 $250 
Government Match for 
Additional Contribution 
$250 $250 
Total  $750 $750 
Total in Retirement Account 
after $700 Withdrawal 
$0 $350 ($300 Recipient 
Contributions and $50 Match) 
e. Early Withdrawal Penalty 
Generally, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a 10% additional 
tax where a taxpayer withdraws money from a qualified retirement 
plan prior to reaching the age of 59 ½.196 Equity considerations re-
quire that the penalty should continue to apply to any early 
                                                   
196. I.R.C. § 72(t). 
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withdrawal made by a recipient of the EITC. However, the penalty 
should only apply to amounts received from the governmental 
match, not from the participant’s contributions. This is distin-
guishable from traditional retirement accounts. The rationale for 
this exception stems from the fundamental purpose of the EITC. 
As already noted, two of the most important objectives of the EITC 
are to offset the regressive nature of Social Security taxes and to 
provide relief from inflationary food and energy prices for low-
income workers. These objectives may conflict with the goal of in-
creased saving. The purpose of modifying the EITC is to reduce 
the likelihood that low-income workers will need to rely completely 
on Social Security benefits in retirement. It is of paramount im-
portance that an EITC recipient not be dissuaded from 
participating in the program for fear that if money is needed for 
basic necessities of life, the EITC recipient must sacrifice a portion 
of the EITC resulting from the 10% penalty.197 In other words, it is 
unlikely that an EITC recipient will participate in a program that 
may result in a forfeiture resulting from the 10% penalty when that 
EITC recipient can receive the money upfront without any tax ex-
posure. These considerations are not relevant when the match is at 
issue. To the extent that an EITC participant is vested in the gov-
ernment match and makes an early withdrawal, the participant will 
be subject to the 10% penalty on the withdrawal of the match. For 
example, if a forty-year old EITC participant satisfies the vesting 
requirements and withdraws the government match totaling $2000, 
the participant will be subject to a $200 penalty. Conversely, a sixty-
year old participant will not be subject to the $200 penalty.  
It is important to note that the exceptions from the early with-
drawal penalty, including withdrawals for qualified higher 
education expenses198 and qualified first-time homebuyer distribu-
tions,199 should apply to EITC retirement savings. With respect to 
                                                   
197. The 10% penalty does not apply to amounts forfeited where the participant is not 
fully vested in the government contributions. As a result, a participant may forfeit a portion 
of the government contribution under the vesting schedule and be subject to the 10% pen-
alty for early withdrawal for the nonforfeited amount.  
198. See id. § 72(t)(7). According to I.R.C. § 72(t), there is a 10% additional tax on early 
distributions of qualified retirement plans, but the additional tax does not apply to qualified 
higher education expenses if they are furnished to the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s spouse, or 
any child or grandchild of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s spouse if it is paid to an eligible 
educational institution. See id. § 72(t)(7)(A)(i)-(iii). 
199. See id. § 72(t)(8). The additional tax does not apply to “qualified first-time home-
buyer distributions” if within 120 days of the distribution, the distribution is used to 
purchase the principal residence of a first-time homebuyer and the purchaser is the taxpay-
er, the spouse of taxpayer, or any child, grandchild, or ancestor of the taxpayer or taxpayer’s 
spouse. Id. § 72(t)(8)(A). In addition, the lifetime ceiling for “qualified first-time homebuy-
er distributions” cannot exceed $10,000. Id. § 72(t)(8)(B). Qualified acquisition costs 
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qualified higher education expenses, the EITC rules already pro-
mote education by entitling the taxpayer to claim a full-time 
student under the age of twenty-four as a qualifying child. While 
the primary objective of an EITC sponsored retirement account is 
to build retirement savings, the withdrawal of funds for education-
al purposes should not result in a penalty because it is consistent 
with the purpose of reducing poverty of the elderly. The purchase 
of a principal residence is similarly consistent with the desired goal 
of asset accumulation.  
C. Viability of Proposal 
The proposal to add a savings component to the EITC should be 
“fair, easy to comply with and administer, conducive to economic 
growth, produce adequate revenue and provide little interference 
with private economic decisions.”200 It meets the standard for viabil-
ity. First, it is a fair proposal. It comports with vertical equity in that 
it is targeted solely at the lowest income taxpayers, unlike the sav-
er’s credit. It also satisfies the horizontal equity principle in that 
similarly situated taxpayers should be taxed similarly. Historical 
data establishes that because certain categories of workers lack ac-
cess to employer retirement plans, they are not provided with the 
opportunity to contribute wages to a tax-deferred retirement plan 
and therefore are not being taxed similarly to a taxpayer who earns 
the same wages. My proposed expansion of the EITC corrects this 
horizontal equity problem by enabling many low-income workers 
to contribute a small portion of their EITC to a retirement vehicle. 
Second, the proposal is easy to comply with and to administer. 
While complexity is difficult to avoid in any tax provision, the 
structure of the expanded EITC meets the criteria: it is already a 
part of an established statutory provision; the computation of the 
credit will not change; and the implementation of the EITC pro-
posal should not create too great of an administrative burden. 
Obviously, the Department of the Treasury will need to amend a 
few tax forms and related publications to implement the proposed 
expansion of the EITC. To the extent that a low-income worker 
                                                   
include “acquiring, constructing, or reconstructing a residence” and “settlement, financing, 
or other closing costs.” Id. § 72(t)(8)(C). An individual qualifies as a first-time homebuyer if 
the individual had no ownership of a home two years prior to the date of acquisition. Id. 
§ 72(t)(8)(D).  
200. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Widening Gap Under the Internal Revenue Code: The Need for 
Renewed Progressivity, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 43 (2001) (citing Michael J. Graetz, The Decline 
(and Fall?) of the Income Tax 10 (1997)). 
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already contributes to an established 401(k) plan or IRA, the gov-
ernment match can be done electronically through the same direct 
deposit method that is already in place. The proposal establishing 
an automatic contribution and match minimizes complexity. The 
EITC is automatically reduced by 10% of the credit. If a recipient 
wants to opt out of the automatic contribution, the recipient 
should only be required to check a newly created box on the tax 
return. To the extent that an EITC recipient has made a contribu-
tion to an IRA or 401(k) plan during the taxable year entitling the 
recipient to the match, it is reflected on the tax return consistently 
with the manner in which it is currently reported. There is no add-
ed complexity because this information is already reported for 
purposes of the saver’s credit. With respect to compliance, the gov-
ernment needs to continue to reduce the error rate of EITC 
returns; however, the establishment of a savings component to the 
EITC should not create additional compliance concerns.  
Third, the proposal is conducive to economic growth. In the 
short-term, it may appear otherwise. However, only a small percent-
age of the EITC will be automatically contributed to a retirement 
plan or IRA. The vast majority of the EITC will continue to stimulate 
the economy by providing much-needed funds to recipients to pur-
chase basic necessities. It will also improve long-term economic 
growth by helping to reduce the number of retirees who are living 
below the poverty level.  
Fourth, the cost of the proposal must be considered. According 
to the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, tax incentives cost 
the federal government $500 billion per year or over 4% of the 
gross domestic product.201 During taxable year 2006, the total EITC 
claimed by all taxpayers was approximately $44.4 billion.202 The cost 
of my proposal will likely increase this amount. However, the cost 
of the proposal is offset by the fact that the recipient is already en-
titled to the amount automatically contributed to a retirement 
                                                   
201. Lily L. Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 43 (2006) (citing Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th 
Congress, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2006–2010 
(Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter Estimates], available at http://www.jct.gov/s-2-06.pdf). 
202. See Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2006, SOI Bull., Fall 2008, at 5, 12 
fig.H, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08fallbul.pdf. The $44.4 billion was signif-
icantly lower than other tax incentives that primarily benefited wealthy taxpayers. During 
the same taxable year, over 90% of net capital gains and qualified dividends were claimed by 
taxpayers with income of at least $100,000. See id. at 11 fig.F. The staff of the Joint Commit-
tee on Taxation estimated that the reduced rate on capital gains and dividends cost the 
federal government approximately $92 billion in lost revenue. See Estimates, supra note 
201, at 34 tbl.1. In addition, the staff estimated that the exclusion of capital gains at death 
resulting from the “stepped-up” adjusted basis rules under I.R.C. § 1014 cost the govern-
ment an additional $51 billion in lost revenues. See id. 
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account and that the recipient will forfeit the government match if 
the minimum vesting requirements are not met. In addition, tax-
payers who receive an additional EITC allocated to retirement 
savings are not entitled to claim the saver’s credit during the same 
taxable year.203 As already noted, the maximum amount that a sin-
gle taxpayer can receive under the proposed expansion of the 
EITC is $1000 for single taxpayers and $2000 for married taxpayers 
filing a joint return. These maximum amounts are consistent with 
the current saver’s credit in order to minimize potential federal 
revenue shortfall, although it is not a complete wash because the 
saver’s credit is nonrefundable. Moreover, the enhancement of 
current tax incentives for the working poor and other low-income 
workers will lower the possibility that they will be dependent on 
direct expenditures during their retirement years.  
Finally, because the percentage that is automatically allocable to 
a retirement savings vehicle is relatively nominal, implementation 
of the proposal does not significantly interfere with private eco-
nomic decisions, since EITC recipients are entitled to opt out of 
the automatic contributions based on their own financial needs.  
VII. Conclusion 
In recent years, Congress enacted tax incentives to benefit low-
income workers by placing more tax dollars in their wallets. The 
recently-enacted Making Work Pay, 204 First-Time Homebuyer,205 and 
                                                   
203. This approach is used for other tax incentives. For example, there are several tax 
incentives that are intended to encourage education. Taxpayers can claim the nonrefunda-
ble Hope or Lifetime Learning Credit. See I.R.C. § 25A. The Code also allows for an above 
the line deduction for tuition and fees. See id. § 222. However, both sections deny any possi-
bility of a double benefit by stating that the taxpayer must elect either the deduction or 
credit but not both. See id. §§ 25A(g)(5), 222(c). 
204. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1001, 123 
Stat. 115, 309#12. For taxable years 2009 and 2010, low and middle-income workers general-
ly will receive the credit in the form of lower withholdings, but some workers will receive 
their benefits in the form of a refundable credit on their tax returns. Id. § 1001, 123 Stat. at 
310; see I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-13 (Feb. 21, 2009). The maximum credit is $400 ($800 
for a married couple filing a joint return). American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1001, 
123 Stat. at 310.  
205. In 2008, in order to reinvigorate the housing market, Congress enacted a maximum 
refundable credit of $7500 or 10% of the purchase price of a principal residence purchased 
on or after April 9, 2008 and before July 1, 2009. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3011, 122 Stat. 2654, 2888-91. Congress extended the refunda-
ble credit to December 1, 2009, increased the credit to $8000, and eliminated the obligation 
to repay under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act § 1006. There are currently several proposals that have been intro-
duced in the House and Senate to expand the current $8000 tax credit. See Stephanie 
Armour, Tax Credit for Home Purchase Could Rise; Proposals Call for Expanding Benefits, U.S.A. 
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American Opportunities refundable credits206 supplement the 
longstanding refundable credits that include the EITC and the 
Additional Child Tax Credit. These established programs provide 
much-needed cash for low-income workers and help them acquire 
an education and purchase consumable products. With the excep-
tion of the First-Time Homebuyer Credit, however, these credits do 
little to encourage asset accumulation. Therefore, additional tax 
incentives are required to encourage wealth accumulation in the 
form of retirement savings because the incentives to save that are 
targeted at the working poor and other low-income workers are 
ineffective. The saver’s credit has proven to be ineffective as a tax 
incentive for the working poor. Many low-income workers lack ac-
cess to employer qualified 401(k) plans. This is particularly true for 
part-time employees, employees working in a service occupation, 
and employees working for small businesses.  
All individuals, including low-income workers, need to rely on 
the “three-legged stool” of Social Security, pension plans, and per-
sonal savings to finance their retirement years. In order to provide 
an additional incentive for low-income workers to save for retire-
ment, the EITC should be expanded to add a savings component. 
This expansion must include an automatic enrollment option. The 
ability of an employer to establish an automatic enrollment option 
has been strengthened by the PPA. In order to counter the lack of 
access by low-income workers, part-time employees, and non-white 
employees, a savings vehicle similar to the TSP should be utilized. 
Ten percent of the EITC benefits should automatically be added to 
a retirement savings vehicle. To the extent that the recipient of 
EITC benefits contributes a greater percentage to a retirement sav-
ings vehicle, the government should match the contribution dollar 
for dollar, with a maximum contribution of $1000. That figure 
equals the maximum credit allowable under the saver’s credit for 
single taxpayers. Married taxpayers filing a joint return are entitled 
                                                   
Today, June 22, 2009, at 1A. Economists believe that expansion of the credit is critical to 
the housing market recovery. Id.  
206. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1004. The Act expands the eligible ex-
penses to include books and computer equipment not purchased from the educational 
institution, provides a maximum credit of $2500, allows for a portion of the education cred-
its to be refundable, and applies to expenses related to the first four years of postsecondary 
education. Id. Congress enacted the American Opportunity Tax Credit because of represen-
tations by some that the cost of post-secondary education has grown faster than the 
inflationary rate and that the expansion of the credit will help people with financial difficul-
ties obtain a post-secondary education. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th 
Congress, Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal 
Year 2010 Budget Proposal—Part One: Individual Income Tax and Estate and Gift 
Tax Provisions 107 (Comm. Print 2009), available at http://www.jct.gov/ 
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3573. 
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to the same $2000 maximum government contribution that is al-
lowed under the saver’s credit. The taxpayer would not be 
permitted to receive both the EITC retirement benefits and claim 
the saver’s credit in the same taxable year. Finally, the match that 
an EITC recipient receives will be forfeited to the extent that the 
recipient is not vested in it. To the extent that the recipient is vest-
ed in the benefits but withdraws the amounts contributed to a 
retirement account prior to reaching age 59 ½, the recipient will 
be subject to the early distribution penalty of 10%, unless the with-
drawal or distribution meets one of the allowable exceptions. 
As noted, the EITC has received nonpartisan support. While the 
EITC’s error rate has historically been high, it remains an im-
portant tax incentive. The modifications to the credit suggested in 
my proposal satisfy the equity principle of fairness. If properly 
structured, it should not be too complicated to administer. In addi-
tion, consistent with many other tax incentives, its implementation 
will impact federal revenue. However, because of the numerous 
barriers to saving experienced by low-income workers and the im-
portance of ensuring that low-income individuals have 
accumulated sufficient retirement assets, my proposal will create 
an effective vehicle for encouraging recipients of the EITC to save. 
Finally, implementation of the proposal will not significantly im-
pact the primary goals of the EITC. 
